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ABSTRACT. This paper provides an introduction to the history and practice of 
lying in public life. The paper argues that such an approach is required to balance 
the emphasis on truth and truth-telling. Truth and lies, truth-telling and the practice 
of lying are concepts of binary opposition that help define one another. The paper 
reviews Foucault’s work on truth-telling before analysing the “culture of lying” and 
its relation to public life by focusing on Arendt’s work. 
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To lie is a horrible filthy vice; and which an ancient writer setteth forth very 
shamefully, when he saith that whosoever lieth witnesseth that he contemneth God 
and therewithall feareth men. It is impossible more richly to represent the horrour, 
the vilenesse and the disorder of it: for, what can be imagined so vile and base as to 
be a coward towards men and a boaster towards God? 
--Montaigne, The Second Booke, XVIII, “Of Giving the Lie”, at 
http://ww.w.mises.ch/library/Montaigne_Essays_Florio_Translation.pdf 
 
The deliberate falsehood and the outright lie, used as legitimate means to achieve 
political ends have been with us since the beginning of recorded history. 
Truthfulness has never been counted among the political virtues, and lies have 
always been regarded as justifiable tools in political dealings. 
--Hannah Arendt (1971) “Lying in Politics: Reflections on The Pentagon Papers”, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1971/nov/18/lying-in-politics-
reflections-on-the-pentagon-pape/   
 
1. Introduction: Lying and Public Life 
 
Jeff Malpass (2008) begins his reflection on “Truth, Lies, and Deceit: On 
Ethics in Contemporary Public Life” by documenting the way truth and 
deceit in public life has become a major issue in the West. He rightly 
mentions the huge concern over the deceit and deception by leading 
politicians involved in the invasion of the Iraq war and notes that the public 
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focus of lying and deceit has not been restricted to politics. CEOs of major 
companies and bank managers (particularly since the Global Financial 
Crisis) have been involved in systematic fraud, insider trading and deliberate 
manipulations of the Libor exchange rate. Not only have these corporate 
players not abided by regulatory obligations and responsibilities but also 
after being charged they have actively lied, falsified and deceived their 
clients and the public at large with the result that people have lost their trust 
in the leading political and business institutions. Untruthfulness, deceit and 
lying are not restricted to these twin spheres as recent cover-ups in relation 
to institutional child abuse in the church, in schools, and other related 
institutions reveal.1 Malpass takes the public uproar and controversy as 
evidence that we still care about truth and truthfulness, and yet he canvases 
the view that our commitment to truth (Nyberg, 1993; Bailey, 1991), given 
the extent on deceit and lying in public and personal life, itself might based 
upon a lie. He goes on to maintain the central significance of truth and truth-
telling to questions of self and society: 
 
The question concerning the role and significance of truth and 
truth-telling lies at the heart of our understanding of ourselves—
how we think about truth makes a huge difference to the sort of 
life we understand ourselves as living, the sort of society we take 
ourselves to be part of, the sort of relationship we have to the 
world (p. 2). 
 
Malpass clearly holds that truth, and the commitment to truth, is at the very 
heart of both ethical practice and the practice of democracy.2  
In a conference on “Law and Lies” held by the University of Alabama 
School of Law the question of deception and lying is raised concerning their 
ubiquity in public life: 
 
From the noble lie of Plato’s Republic to the controversy about 
former President Clinton’s “lying” in the Monica Lewinsky case, 
from the use of secrecy in today’s war against terrorism to the 
endless spinning of political campaigns, from President John 
Kennedy’s behavior during the Cuban missile crisis to cover ups 
concerning pedophile priests in the Catholic church, from Freud’s 
efforts to decode the secrets beneath civilized life to contemporary 
exposés of the private lives of politicians, lying and deception 
seem ubiquitous in our public life.3  
 
In a prominent example, the conviction of Lord Archer, one-time chairman 
of the Conservative party, in the United Kingdom and the many media 
biographies that quickly followed his downfall, bought home a host of 
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questions about the question of lying, not just in public life but also, more 
generally, in our private lives. With Lord Archer’s successful prosecution, 
listening to the report of his trial, it seems that among his peers – 
conservative politicians, leaders of the party, friends and even his wife – 
lying was considered to be much more heinous than anything to do with his 
sexual immorality. Indeed, even his wife seemed to tolerate his many affairs 
outside marriage. As she publicly acknowledged in a TV interview, sexual 
infidelity was only moderately important to her. Far more important to her, 
and Archer agreed, was loyalty. Archer’s one-night stands with prostitutes 
were also, it seems, easily forgiven. Sexual ‘indiscretions’ are tolerated in 
both public and private morality but lying is not. Is this because our sexual 
mores and morality have changed whereas the morality of lying has 
remained more or less the same? Does this speak to the stability of some 
ethical practices and the relative changeability of others? 
Archer’s crime officially was perjury, a concept in jurisprudence that 
refers to the intentional act of swearing a false oath or falsifying an 
affirmation to tell the truth. Perjury is a statutory offence in England under 
the Perjury Act of 1911 that states: 
  
If any person lawfully sworn as a witness or as an interpreter in a 
judicial proceeding wilfully makes a statement material in that 
proceeding, which he knows to be false or does not believe to be 
true, he shall be guilty of perjury, and shall, on conviction thereof 
on indictment, be liable to penal servitude for a term not 
exceeding seven years, or to imprisonment . . . for a term not 
exceeding two years, or to a fine or to both such penal servitude or 
imprisonment and fine. 
(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/1-2/6) 
 
Perjury is the act of a person’s deliberately making false or misleading 
statements while under oath, sometimes termed “false swearing” or “false 
oath” or in archaic language “forswearing”. 
Archer was convicted of three charges of perverting the course of justice 
and one of perjury (committed at the 1987 trial) that centered on allegations 
he had sex with a prostitute.  He was cleared of one charge of perverting the 
course of justice. Archer also was accused of lying and creating false diaries 
to win £500,000 pounds in libel damages from the Daily Star newspaper in 
1987. He took the tabloid to court and won after it alleged that he paid 
prostitute Monica Coghlan for sex in September 1986. This is how the BBC 
News reported the charges facing Archer: 
 
Lord Archer faced dishonesty charges arising from his successful 
1987 libel action, in which he won £500,000 damages from the 
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Daily Star over allegations that he slept with a prostitute.  He was 
accused of asking his former friend Mr Francis, 67, to provide him 
with a false alibi for a night relating to the libel case and of 
producing fake diary entries to back up his story.  Lord Archer 
was found guilty of two charges of perjury and two of perverting 
the course of justice.  The first charge was that he perverted the 
course of justice by asking Ted Francis to give him a false alibi.  
The second guilty verdict was on a charge that he perverted the 
course of justice by using a fake diary in the libel trial.  He was 
found to have perjured himself in an affidavit to the High Court 
for the libel action.  He was also found to have perjured himself on 
oath during the libel trial. He was cleared of a final count of 
perverting the course of justice in relation to a diary used in the 
libel case, in which he was awarded £500,000 after the Daily Star 




On reflection one might argue that truth and the absence of lies is at the very 
basis of jurisprudence as it is in public life. Or perhaps we might say that the 
methodology for determining the facts of the case and the systematic 
elimination of lies or lying is close to the heart or spirit of the enterprise. 
Indeed, one of the objects of the law of evidence is to ensure that witnesses 
tell the truth and in the past when religious faith was stronger the oath, 
swearing on the Bible, was deemed to be an effective and appropriate way of 
ensuring that witnesses told the truth. 
Certainly, the religious view in the Christian tradition has taken a very 
dim view of lying and lies. From the Old Testament, and from Augustine 
through to Montaigne, lying has been viewed as a sin that admits no 
reservations. The Old Testament references both concern the issue of false 
witness, for example, "you shall not bear false witness against your 
neighbour" (Exodus, 20:16) and how lying is wicked and against the Lord in 
the following proverbs: "a worthless person, a wicked man,...one with a false 
mouth", (Proverbs, 6:12); "lying lips are an abomination to the Lord" 
(Proverbs, 12:22). In the New Testament similar sentiments are expressed 
through the use of the Greek words for “false” or “lie” (pseudes, pseudomai, 
pseudos, pseustes) and Greek words for “deceitful” or “false” (dolios, 
dolioo, dolos, doloo). The Greek word for truth is aletheia, meaning "not 
hidden." To lie, then, is to hide the truth. 
In De Mendacio Augustine takes a hard line on lying; all lies no matter 
what form are wrong.4 That lies are sinful, not surprising, is also the view of 
the Catholic Church. In Retractions, Augustine suggests that his discussion 
is “useful for the mind”, “profitable for morals” and, most importantly, its 
significance lies in “inculcating the love of speaking the truth” (ibid.). It is 
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this broad theological position that is echoed by Montaigne and both seems 
to indicate that lying is in some sense a deformation of meaning and 
language and harmful to society. Sissela Bok (1999: 31) as one of the first 
modern commentators to revive academic interest in lying adopts a similar 
view that lying is detrimental to society because it erodes trust as the very 
foundation of relations among human beings that sustains our institutions. It 
is argued that truth and truthfulness is a precondition for society. 
General introductions to ethics generally emphasize that lying is morally 
wrong because it breaches trust and erodes trust as a habitual way of being 
exemplifying the very ethos of society. Thus, for instance, James Rachels 
(2011) writing about subjectivism in ethics first discusses the basic idea of 
ethical subjectivism and the evolution of the theory from simple 
subjectivism to emotivism in order to introduce “moral facts”. Rachels then 
discusses “proofs” in ethics in terms of the process of giving reasons and 
explaining why reasons matter by offering the following example: once we 
know that Jones is a bad man because he is a habitual liar, then we can go on 
to explain why lying is bad. In other words, we can support our judgments 
with good reasons.  
 
Lying is bad, first, because it harms people. If I give you false 
information, and you rely on it, things may go wrong for you in all 
sorts of ways. Second, lying is bad because it is a violation of 
trust. Trusting another person means leaving oneself vulnerable 
and unprotected. When I trust you, I simply believe what you say, 
without taking precautions; and when you lie, you take advantage 
of my trust. That is why being given the lie is such an intimate and 
personal offense. And finally, the rule requiring truthfulness is 
necessary for society to exist – if we could not assume that other 
people will speak truthfully, communication would be impossible, 
and if communication was impossible, society would be 
impossible (pp. 42-43).5 
 
This rationalist approach echoes Kurt Baier’s (1958) The Moral Point of 
View that constructs a justification for morality anchored in rationality and 
reason-giving practices grounded in practical reason that “saves” the 
enterprise from forms of subjectivism and egoism. The approach does not 
recognise, however, the geneaological approach to truth-telling or to lying.  
 
2. Foucault on Truth-telling 
 
On truth telling as a practice I have been greatly influenced by Foucault’s 
genealogical approach (Peters, 2001). Foucault himself was strongly 
influenced by his readings of both Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger 
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and indebted to them for ideas that led him to emphasize the close 
conceptual relations between the notions of truth, power and subjectivity in 
his genealogical investigations. Nietzsche’s work, in particular, provided 
Foucault with novel ways to re-theorize and conceive anew the operation of 
power and desire in the constitution and self-overcoming of human subjects. 
It enabled him to analyze the modes by which human beings become 
subjects without according either power or desire conceptual priority over 
the other, as had been the case in the discourses of Marxism (with its accent 
on power) and of Freudianism (with its accent on desire).  
From Nietzsche’s On The Genealogy of Morals (1967), Foucault also 
intellectually inherited the concept and method of genealogy, a form of 
historical analysis that inquires into the formation and structure of value 
accorded Man, Reason, and Truth through a variety of techniques, including 
both etymological and linguistic inquiry alongside the investigation of the 
history of concepts.6 For Foucault, as for Nietzsche, genealogy replaces 
ontology. Foucault’s investigations into the modes by which human beings 
are made into subjects are, above all, historical investigations of 
constellations of practices. For Foucault, as for Nietzsche, there are no 
essences of human beings and, therefore, also no possibility for universalist 
theories concerning the nature of human beings. Given that there is no 
human nature, fixed once and for all -- no essential or universalizable nature 
-- there is no question of a science of human nature (à la Hobbs or Hume) or 
the possibility of building or deriving theories of morality, politics, or law on 
the basis of this alleged nature. All questions of ontology, in the hands of 
Nietzsche and Foucault, become radically historicized. There is no sovereign 
individual or transcendental subject, but only human beings that have been 
historically constituted as subjects in different ways at different times 
through constellations of practices. 
Foucault did not deny either the classical ideal of truth as correspondence 
to an independently existing world or the contemporary correspondence 
theory of truth. The early Nietzsche, by contrast, cast doubt precisely on this 
ideal. For the early Nietzsche truth is a convenient fiction, merely a belief 
about the possession of truth. 
In “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense” Nietzsche writes that 
“truth” is: 
 
A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms 
– in short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, 
transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which 
after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: 
truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what 
they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous 
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power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as 
metal, no longer as coins.7 
 
This deceptively simple position is based on the understanding that concepts 
are human inventions and as metaphors they do not correspond to reality. 
After inventing them we forget that they are only metaphors and treat them 
as “true” believing that they correspond and picture reality (see Glenn, 
2004). There is no match between language and the thing-in-itself. And yet 
“truth” while based on illusions is still useful for practical purposes. It is also 
essentially a part of aesthetics and the imagination that creates a mythical 
truth through a web of concepts to describe the world through art. While 
Nietzsche’s view might strike the reader as idiosyncratic David Simpson 
(2007) makes the case that there are striking parallels between Nietzsche and 
Plato on truth and truthfulness and as a consequence they share similar views 
on the nature of philosophy and its possibilities. 
Foucault’s innovation was to historicize “truth”, first, materially in 
discourse as “regimes of truth” and, second, in practices as “games of truth”. 
He gave six lectures entitled “Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of 
Parrhesia", at Berkeley during the months of October-November in 1983.8 In 
these lectures, Foucault outlines the meanings and the evolution of the 
classical Greek word “parrhesia” and its cognates, as they enter into and 
exemplify the changing practices of truth-telling in Greek society. In 
particular, Foucault investigates “the use of parrhesia in specific types of 
human relationships” and “the procedures and techniques employed in such 
relationships” (34/66).  
Foucault claims that the word parrhesia occurs for the first time in 
Euripides (c.484-407 BC) and then is used in the Greek world of letters from 
the end of the Fifth Century BC. The word is normally translated into 
English as “free speech” and parrhesiastes, the person who uses parrhesia, 
is the one who speaks the truth. Indeed, the meaning of the word as it 
evolves in Greek and Roman culture, develops five major characteristics. 
First, it is associated with frankness: parrhesia refers to a special type of 
relationship between the speaker and what he says.9 Unlike rhetoric, which 
provides the speaker with technical devices to help him persuade an 
audience, covering up his own beliefs, in parrhesia, the speaker makes it 
manifestly clear what he believes. Second, parrhesia is linked with truth. In 
the Greek, parrhesia is a speech activity where there is an exact coincidence 
between belief and truth. Foucault (1999: 3) claims: “The ‘parrhesiastic 
game’ presupposes that the parrhesiastes is someone who has the moral 
qualities which are required, first, to know the truth, and secondly, to convey 
such truth to others.” 
Foucault (1999: 5) provides a summary of his discussion of parrhesia: 
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Parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a 
specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship 
to his own life through danger, a certain relation to himself or 
other people through criticism…, and a specific relation to moral 
law through freedom and duty. More precisely, parrhesia is a 
verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal 
relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-
telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as 
himself). In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses 
frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or 
silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism 
instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and 
moral apathy.  
  
This new kind of philosophical parrhesia that arises in Greco-Roman 
culture, Foucault characterizes, first, as “a practice which shaped the specific 
relations that individuals have to themselves” (40/66). Much of the 
philosophy that emerged with Socrates and Plato, and shaped the 
philosophical tradition that is still ours today and which defines the roots of 
our moral subjectivity involved the playing of certain games of truth. 
 
3. The Culture of Lying 
 
Foucault’s genealogical analysis of truth telling in my view requires a 
supplementary analysis of the practices of lying. After all, the concepts of 
true and false, truth and falsity, are strictly binary concepts that take their 
purchase from the contrast of each other, especially in the development of 
two-value logics or truth table calculus. As Max Urchs (2006) points out 
while lying is a ubiquitous element of communication, it is almost 
completely ignored by traditional logic. There is a deep-seated tendency 
dating from early Christian sources that lying is a defective function of 
language and that its structure deforms communication to the harm of 
society generally, even although this normative view is not accompanied by 
a formal or logical analysis. Urchs (2006: 69) suggests that even with 
making the assumptions that 
 
In many types of communication, lying is an important element 
[and] 
Deceptive speech acts have some characteristic internal structure. 
Moreover, in order to be efficient they must respect certain 
requirements of rationality. 





To sum up the … hindrances for an adequate formal analysis of 
lies we put together the main points. 
• lies produce inconsistencies; 
• whether an utterance is a lie or not heavily depends on context; 
• according to background knowledge there may occur a flic-flac-
effect; 
• causal and intentional aspects are indispensable in an analysis of 
lies. 
To be sure, all these topics are handled by modern logic. And yet, 
to merge them into one formal framework, which remains 
practically feasible seems hard enough. So it is not surprising that 
a satisfactory logic of lying is still to come (p. 88). 
 
Urchs (2006) demonstrates the difficulty of proposing a formal account of 
lying. In the informal sense (in ordinary language as opposed to logical 
notation), James Mahon (2008) provides the standard definition of lying 
following Bernard Williams’ formulation: 
 
“I take a lie to be an assertion, the content of which the speaker 
believes to be false, which is made with the intention to deceive 
the hearer with respect to that content” (Williams 2002, 96); or, 
more formally: 
To lie =df to make an assertion that is believed to be false to some 
audience with the intention to deceive the audience about the 
content of that assertion. 
 
Mahon modifies the definition as: 
 
To lie =df to make a believed-false statement to another person 
with the intention that that other person believe that statement to 
be true. 
 
He unpacks four necessary conditions: 
 
First, lying requires that a person make a statement (statement 
condition). Second, lying requires that the person believe the 
statement to be false, that is, lying requires that the statement be 
untruthful (untruthfulness condition). Third, lying requires that the 
untruthful statement be made to another person (addressee 
condition). Fourth, lying requires that the person intend that that 
other person believe the untruthful statement to be true (intention 
to deceive addressee condition). 
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This logical analysis is useful but lying is also a complex cultural practice 
that varies across history and cultures and is open to a genealogical analysis. 
Some idea of its complexity can be gauged both from the difficulty of 
treating it in a formal system and also it terms of the overlapping network of 
concepts involving a range of different practices from the white-lie, (Plato’s) 
noble lie, fibbing, the bare-faced lie, to bullshit, bluffing, deceit, deception, 
and pathological lying.10 This list does not mention associated forms of 
dissimulation, dissembling, propaganda, newspeak, deliberate bias and so 
on. These associated practices demonstrate how pervasive lying is. If it was 
to take in these and other forms of behavior, then it would help explain how 
pervasive lying is in public and personal life. To recognize associated these 
forms and practice point to the demand for an “anthropology of lying” 
although I have found no such study or literature. (Ethnography itself seems 
dependent on “true” narratives of informants and is famously open to 
distortions as Margaret Mead’s experience in recording Pacific stories 
demonstrates).11 
I am encouraged to think of lying as a set of cultural practices partly 
through the influence of Foucault’s genealogy. Wittgenstein’s (1953) 
language-game analysis is also very helpful in understanding lying as yet 
another language game. Wittgenstein writes: “Lying is another language 
game that needs to be learned like any other one” (para. 241). Lying is not a 
misuse of language, it is just another language game. Simulation would seem 
to be one of the basic features of language games of emotions. Buzar et al 
(2010) take up this point to apply speech act theory to lying: 
 
“to lie” is a speech act like any other and it should be performed 
properly (satisfied, happy, etc. similar as “to pretend”, Austin, 
1961:201-20), and “lying is a language-game that needs to be 
learned like any other one” (it should be learned and practiced 
properly, Wittgenstein, 2001 §:249). “Being truthful” and “being 
lying” or to tell the truth and to tell a lie are practically irrelevant 
for understanding lying. What seems to be much more interesting 
are cases where these two are hard to differentiate because there 
are lies which do not include previous intent to deceive and there 
are truths which are in fact half-truths, incomplete truths, or 
avoidances of the truth (p. 34). 
 
Buzar and his colleagues explore the many intermediate cases between lying 
and truth-telling to conclude, 
 
we lie much more than we in fact believe we do (this 
rationalisation is part of good practice of various professions like 
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business, legal, political, medical etc. as well as our daily life in 
which habitual lying, is part of upbringing, customs and culture) 
(p. 38). 
 
It is a substantial argument that brings us back to lying and its ubiquity in 
public life and also to Hannah Arendt’s insightful essay “Lying in Politics” 
with which this paper began.  
Arendt’s article consists in a series of reflections on the Pentagon Papers 
and she bases her assessment on the history of the lie in political culture. In 
“Truth and Politics” (1967) and “Lying in Politics” (1971) Arendt reflects 
the fundamental relationship between lying and politics. She explains the 
nature of political action in the context of lying with surprising consequences 
that run against modern intuitions and threatens to change our understanding 
of the history of politics. In “Lying in Politics” Arendt provides an account 
of political imagination that draws interconnections between “the ability to 
lie, the deliberate denial of factual truth, and the capacity to change facts, the 
ability to act.” She writes: 
 
when we talk about lying, and especially about lying among acting 
men, let us remember that the lie did not creep into politics by 
some accident of human sinfulness; moral outrage, for this reason 
alone, is not likely to make it disappear. The deliberate falsehood 
deals with contingent facts, that is with matters which carry no 
inherent truth within themselves, no necessity to be as they are; 
factual truths are never compellingly true. The historian knows 
how vulnerable is the whole texture of facts in which we spend 
our daily lives; it is always in danger of being perforated by single 
lies or torn to shreds by the organized lying of groups, nations, or 
classes, or denied and distorted, often carefully covered up by 
reams of falsehoods or simply allowed to fall into oblivion. Facts 
need testimony to be remembered and trustworthy witnesses to be 
established in order to find a secure dwelling place in the domain 
of human affairs. From this, it follows that no factual statement 
can ever be beyond doubt—as secure and shielded against attack 




She continues in a Nietzschean vein: 
 
It is this fragility that makes deception so easy up to a point, and 
so tempting. It never comes into a conflict with reason, because 
things could indeed have been as the liar maintains they were; lies 
are often much more plausible, more appealing to reason, than 
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reality, since the liar has the great advantage of knowing 
beforehand what the audience wishes or expects to hear. He has 
prepared his story for public consumption with a careful eye to 
making it credible, whereas reality has the disconcerting habit of 





The pervasive role of lying in modern politics requires an historical analysis. 
Cathy Caruth (2010: 79) explains that Arendt in her earlier work The Human 
Condition had elaborated the concept of political action that arose in the 
Greek polis “when words and deeds replaced the mute force of violence and 
created a public sphere in which men appeared before each other and created 
the world anew in unpredictable and unexpected ways.” Caruth (2010: 80) 
points out “the public realm has become a realm of deception” and in a 
world where there is such a conflict between factual truth and politics it is a 
short step to the denial of history and to the systematic political lying that 
invests itself in the public realm and creeps into the history books and into 
the culture more generally.  
The real danger, Caruth (2010) maintains, is when the lie loses its 
traditional role within politics as an alternative means for determining true 
political action to become an all consuming activity that replaces action and 
history altogether to deny history and constructing Arendt’s words an 
“entirely fictional world”, a possibility hugely enhanced an a world based 
more and more on PR and “image making” (p. 82). How much more 
forbidding is Arendt’s analysis when it is viewed at the end of the first 
couple of decades of the twenty-first century when the Internet has become 
the first truly global medium, the image has become supreme and finance 
culture has penetrated and percolated to heart of government. 
Aidan Markland (2012) examining lying and deception in political 
culture demonstrates that that there has been significant historical differences 
in the moral assessment of lying in political culture in the West and adopting 
a Nietzschean and Foucauldian perspective he argues that lying can serve to 
shore up and maintain culture: 
 
With the rise of political realism and secular-positivism, the focus 
of politics shifted from maintaining the moral and psychological 
well-being of citizens (and the values they live by), to the 
maintenance of political power and stability for as long a duration 
as possible (which was central in the works of Machiavelli and 
Hobbes). Lying, in turn, was then justified as a useful political tool 
for sustaining political power. By examining the re-
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conceptualization of lying (for the Greeks it could be morally 
necessary and politically expedient, for the Christians it was 
morally prohibited) for purposes of merely maintaining power, I 
attempt to elucidate a crucial way in which lying serves life. 
Specifically, lying can be used to create the stability of society and 
the political state that is necessary for maintaining culture and 
values more generally (p. 14). 
 
There are as far as I can see two saving graces and checks: first, as Markland 
remarks we should be concerned if lying becomes the province of a one-
party state and, second, drawing on Arendt, the individual lie or even the 
tissue of lies is only tolerable in the name of true political action and if it 




1. See the Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Child Abuse at 
http://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/. The Interim Report was released on 
30 June 2014. I am reminded of the comments of Michael Ignatieff (2001) made in 
The Guardian: “Since its report came out in 1998, the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission has become a model for other societies seeking to 
rebuild their ethical order and find healing and justice after periods of war or 
tyranny.” And we might add “systematic institutional child abuse”. He continues: 
“There are many ways to do this: the de-Nazification of West Germany after 1945 
followed by the de-Stasification of East Germany after 1989, the Chilean, 
Salvadorean and Argentine truth commissions, the international tribunals in The 
Hague and Arusha, the indictment of Pinochet. In all these processes, the essential 
problem is how to balance peace and justice, forgetting and forgiving, healing and 
punishment, truth and reconciliation.” And now to the central point he makes 
relevant to my inquiry: “you cannot create a culture of freedom unless you eliminate 
a specific range of impermissible lies. I put it this way - a range of impermissible 
lies - because all societies, and all human beings lie to them selves all the time. 
Citizens of liberal democracies are fooling themselves if they think we live in truth. 
None of us can support very much truth for very long. But there are a few lies that 
do such harm that they can poison a society just as there are a few lies in private life 
that can destroy a life.” See 
http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2001/oct/13/weekend7.weekend3  
2. See the inspired review essay “Mendacious Flowers” by Martin Jay (1999) 
reviewing George Stephanopoulos’ All too Human: A Political Education and 
Christopher Hitchens’ No One Left to Lie to: The Triangulations of William 
Jefferson Clinton.  
3. See http://www.law.ua.edu/programs/symposiums/law-and-lies/.  The rest of 
the quotation insofar as it concerns the law runs: “And what is true in our public life 
is also true in our legal life. While the law recognizes deceit as a cause of action in 
torts, as the late Arthur Leff famously noted, the law tolerates a lot of deception in 
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market transactions. In addition, while law condemns lying under oath, it condones 
deceptive silence. While law condemns entrapment, it condones deception and 
decoys as acceptable tools in the enforcement of the criminal law. While the law 
values truth it defends the right to lie as an aspect of freedom of speech. This 
conference will investigate the way law responds to lying and deception. When and 
where are they tolerated? When and where are they condemned? What can we learn 
about law by examining its attitude toward lies?” 
4. Augustine starts his inquiry with the question of the innocent or charitable lie 
and whether it is right in any circumstances to tell a lie, see 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1312.htm. Translated by H. 
Browne. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 3. Edited by 
Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and 
edited for New Advent by Kevin 
Knight.<http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1312.htm>.  
5. I am referring to the version of Chapter 3 
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/104_Master_File/104_Readings/Rachels/Subjectiv
ism%20in%20Ethics.pdf. The 2011 seventh edition is prepared with Stuart Rachels.   
6. See Nietzsche’s famous and, apparently, only footnote in the entire corpus of 
his work, which appears after the first essay of the Genealogy of Morals. 
7. This exceprt is from Walter Kaufmann’s translation translation, appearing 
in The Portable Nietzsche, (1976 edition), pp. 46-47, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Truth_and_Lies_in_a_Nonmoral_Sense.  
8. These lectures were edited by Joseph Pearson in 1985, compiled from tape-
recordings made in English by Foucault. As Pearson notes “Since Foucault did not 
write, correct, or edit any part of the text …, it lacks his imprimatur and does not 
represent his own lecture notes”. Pearson’s version was reedited in 1999 for the web 
site www.repb.net (accessed 25 July, 2001) which serves as the text to which I refer.  
9. I use the male pronoun here on purpose as the parrhesiastes must know his 
own genealogy and status and is usually a male citizen (see Foucault, 1999: 5). 
10. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lie that mentions thirty “types” of lying 
though it is doubful if these are discreet types. 
11. It is reported that Americans and Europeans share stereotypical beliefs about 
the way liars act: characteristically they avert their gaze, turn away, and pause while 
giving implasuible accounts. Yet these beliefs are “probably false”, see Global 
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